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Utilitarianism and beyond:
contemporary analytical political theory
dav i d m i l le r and ri c hard dag g e r

General features
In this chapter we sketch a body of political thought that became predominant in the second half of the twentieth century among academic political philosophers, primarily in the English-speaking world, but increasingly
elsewhere, too. To call this type of political thought ‘analytical’ may not
be particularly revealing, but no other term better describes the movement
in question. Sometimes ‘liberal political theory’ is used, and there is indeed a close connection between analytical theory and liberalism. But that
label is in one way too broad and in another too narrow for this kind of
political thinking: too broad because liberalism has assumed many different
philosophical guises in the course of a history much longer than that of our
subject; and too narrow because those who engage in this kind of political
theory use methods of analysis and techniques of argument that are not
confined to liberals.
Indeed, the political theorists and philosophers of the analytical school
often disagree sharply over questions of practical politics, and some have
embraced positions, such as Marxism, that have been historically hostile
to liberalism. They form a school not because of a common ideological
stance, then, but because of certain shared assumptions about the aims and
methods of political thought. These assumptions fall under the following
five headings.
First, political theory can be detached from deep metaphysical questions
about the meaning of human life and the place of human beings in the cosmos. There is no need to settle such questions in order to discover how people should live in societies and order their common affairs. Although political theorists must know something about how human beings behave and
what they value, they need not preface their theories with a general account
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of ‘the human condition’, if that means asking such questions as ‘What can
we know?’, ‘What is the ultimate good?’, ‘Does God exist?’, ‘Is there life
after death?’ In particular this means that political theory must begin from
secular premises, whatever the personal beliefs of the person who engages
in it. This feature distinguishes analytical theory from many other schools of
political philosophy, past and present, and leads some critics to describe it as
comparatively shallow (Parekh 1996). Analytical theorists would say in reply
that since we cannot expect to find agreement on the deep metaphysical
questions, yet have to live together in political communities as best we can,
we must find principles to live by that can be justified in less ambitious ways.
The second feature of analytical theory, as its name perhaps suggests, is
its commitment to conceptual clarity and argumentative rigour. Analytical
theorists begin with the observation that many of the ideas politicians and the
public invoke in political debate are ill-defined and often confused. Concepts
like democracy, freedom and equality are used rhetorically without the
speaker or writer having any clear idea of their meaning. So a first task of
political theory is clarification, which may involve giving an exact definition
of a term like ‘democracy’ or perhaps more often distinguishing between
two or more ways in which such a term can be used, as Isaiah Berlin did in his
celebrated lecture on ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (Berlin 1969). This feature
derived originally from the influence of analytical philosophy, the midcentury movement which held that the task of philosophy was to dissolve
philosophical problems by carefully tracing the ways in which concepts
were used in ordinary language. Initially this had a somewhat stultifying
effect on political theory, because it implied that political theory could not
go beyond the analysis and clarification of the terms of political discourse
(e.g. Macdonald 1951 and Weldon 1953; for a critical appraisal, Miller 1983).
But conceptual clarification soon came to be seen as a preliminary to the
justification of principles and the defence of political positions: it is necessary
to state clearly what democracy and related concepts mean, for example,
if one is to explain why democracy is valuable (see Benn and Peters 1959;
Barry 1965; Pitkin 1967; and the essays collected in Quinton 1967; De
Crespigny and Wertheimer 1970; and Flathman 1973).
According to analytical theorists, the arguments used to justify principles
should be set out explicitly in as rigorous a way as possible. The ideal is to
present a series of deductive steps from premises to conclusion. Although
the arguments given are rarely so logically tight as this, analytical theorists attempt to display the structure of reasoning that leads to a particular
conclusion. Equally, they strive to avoid forms of argument that are prevalent
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in other, less reputable, forms of political thought: appeals to tradition or to
the authority of Great Books, use of rhetorical devices or loose analogies,
and obscurantist jargon. In this respect they follow the example of John
Locke when he complained that ‘vague and insignificant Forms of Speech’
and ‘hard or misapply’d words’ are frequently mistaken for ‘deep Learning
and heighth of Speculation’ (Locke 1975 [1690], p. 10).
The third feature of analytical theory is that its aim is a normative one,
namely to establish political principles that can govern the constitution of
states and the making of public policy. It attempts to answer the questions
that face citizens and their representatives when they vote, or pass legislation, or allocate resources to one project rather than another. Ought the
constitution to include a bill of rights? Should financial support be given
to those who cannot find work? Ought hate speech to be outlawed? These
are the kinds of questions that political theory should answer by establishing
general principles – of liberty or justice, for instance – from which specific
recommendations can be derived. It is political theory written from the perspective of the responsible citizen, one might say, and its aim is to encourage
such citizens to think more clearly and consistently about the issues they
face in the politics of the day. In this respect it diverges radically from forms
of political theory whose avowed aim is to promote the cause of a social
class or other sectional group, or whose purpose is the unmasking of power
relations in contemporary society.
Fourth, analytical theorists all confront, in various ways, the phenomenon
of value-pluralism. That is, they acknowledge that deciding political questions such as those listed above requires us to consider a number of apparently
conflicting ideals – liberty, justice, democracy, economic prosperity and so
forth – each of which may suggest a different answer to the question at stake.
Some thinkers in this camp hold that political philosophy has simply to cope
with the irreducible plurality of political principles: a view eloquently expressed in Berlin’s lecture ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, in which he
argues that the human condition does not allow us to achieve all of our ideals
simultaneously, but forces us to make choices that involve the sacrifice of
one value for another (Berlin 1962). Other thinkers believe that we have
good reason to give precedence to one value: John Rawls, whose theory
will be discussed later in the chapter, has argued in this way for the priority of justice1, while both Robert Nozick and Ronald Dworkin insist that
1. ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought . . . [L]aws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust’
(Rawls 1971, p. 3).
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individual rights should take precedence over other political values (Nozick
1974, esp. ch. 3; Dworkin 1977, ch. 7). Perhaps the most ambitious attempt
to come to terms with value-pluralism has been utilitarianism (discussed in
the next section), which appeals to the principle of greatest happiness as
a supreme arbiter to resolve conflicts between liberty, justice and all other
goods.
Fifth, in a broad sense, analytical political theory must be described as
liberal. It aims to serve as the public philosophy of a society of free and
equal citizens who have choices to make about how their society will
be organised; it assumes that such citizens will often disagree, but that
clear thinking and careful argument can lessen the disagreement and uncover principles that can win widespread support. Within this broad agreement, analytical theorists have taken a wide variety of political stances,
from free-market libertarianism at one extreme to egalitarian socialism
at the other. (They include, for example, analytical Marxists, who have
attempted to reconstruct Marxian political theory by abandoning dialectics and using analytical methods borrowed from non-Marxian economics and philosophy: see Elster 1985; Roemer 1986.) Analytical theory
is liberal, then, but not in the narrow sense that entails a particular view
about the rights of individuals or how extensive the role of the state
should be.
The legacy of utilitarianism
In its origins, analytical theory both grew out of and reacted against the
utilitarian outlook which had achieved a kind of dominance-by-default in
the English-speaking liberal democracies in the twentieth century. Jeremy
Bentham, John Stuart Mill and other ‘philosophic radicals’ had gained
prominence in the first half of the nineteenth century with the argument
that questions of government and policy should be answered by choosing
the available option that appeared likely to contribute most to the aggregate
happiness of those affected. In Britain, especially, this was a great reforming
philosophy, underpinning major changes in economic policy, legal practice
and the machinery of government. But in the later years of the century it
came under attack from various quarters, and was displaced in the universities by the idealism of F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green and their disciples. In
the first half of the twentieth century no utilitarian political philosopher
mounted a systematic defence of utilitarianism to rival Henry Sidgwick’s
The Methods of Ethics, first published in 1874.
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Yet utilitarianism remained a powerful current among economists, especially those ‘welfare economists’ who sought ways to measure and achieve
‘maximum aggregate utility’ (Rescher 1966 provides a succinct summary).
It also enjoyed a quiet revival among moral philosophers after the Second
World War. These philosophers were more concerned to elucidate moral
concepts and to explain the meaning of moral propositions than to put forward substantive criteria by which actions and practices might be assessed,
but when they did turn to matters of substance it was often a form of utilitarianism that emerged. Richard Hare, for example, gave an account of
moral judgements as universalisable prescriptions – that is, action-guiding
judgements that everyone must be able to endorse, no matter what their
place in the world. Arriving at a universalisable prescription required the
moral agent to give equal weight to the preferences of everyone who would
be affected by the judgement’s implementation and to follow the course of
action that would achieve the greatest possible satisfaction of preferences.
Hare’s substantive criterion for testing moral principles was thus utilitarian, with ‘preference-satisfaction’ replacing the traditional ‘happiness’ in the
utilitarian formula (Hare 1963; 1981). In the USA, Richard Brandt’s work
followed a parallel path, from his analysis of moral language to a defence of
a sophisticated form of rule-utilitarianism (Brandt, 1959; 1992). Even John
Rawls, who was soon to become a leading anti-utilitarian, wrote an early
paper defending a form of rule-utilitarianism that he thought would overcome familiar criticisms, such as that utilitarianism might justify punishing
the innocent (Rawls 1955).
Utilitarian thinking also seemed to come naturally to politicians and civil
servants in democratic governments charged with making policy decisions
that affected the welfare of very large numbers of citizens. Over the first
half of the twentieth century, New Liberalism in Britain and the New Deal
in the USA brought a steady expansion of the powers of government, with
new social programmes in education and health, and, under the influence of
J. M. Keynes, a more interventionist style of economic policy. Economic
planning in wartime, and the post-war preoccupation with national defence, amplified these powers still further. Responsible public servants had
somehow to justify such policies to a democratic electorate: but how was
this to be done when these policies typically produced both winners and
losers? Most obviously, by counting the interests of each citizen equally,
and then showing that on balance the gains of the winners outweighed the
losses of the losers. In this way, utilitarianism became the unconscious public
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philosophy of a generation of administrators and their advisers; after all, as
one of them later wrote, ‘the welfare state was itself an essay in utilitarianism’
(Annan 1991, p. 413).
The perception that democratic governments were following the utilitarian principle provoked a reaction from several political philosophers, who
argued that unconstrained utilitarianism might justify abhorrent policies.
They criticised utilitarianism primarily from two directions. First, because
policies were assessed simply by weighing total gains and losses, it was possible on utilitarian grounds to justify policies that violated the basic rights
of certain individuals or groups, or harmed them in some other way, so
long as these costs were outweighed by greater gains elsewhere. Thus draconian forms of punishment might be justified if these acted as an effective
deterrent to potential criminals, or economic policies that imposed severe
costs on a few people could be defended on the grounds that they enhanced
economic efficiency overall. Utilitarianism appeared to have no place for
the idea that each person has a claim to just treatment that could not be
overridden even if doing so produced great benefits for others. This failure
to recognise that a gain to A does not automatically compensate for a loss
to B led to the complaint that utilitarianism ‘does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ (Rawls 1971, p. 27). So it was necessary to look
elsewhere – to a non-utilitarian theory of justice, a theory of human rights,
a theory of freedom, or some other source – to find acceptable principles
for a free society.
The second attack on utilitarianism took a slightly different form. Critics
in this camp pointed out that the injunction to do whatever will produce the best overall consequences places no fixed limits on what people
might do. Absolute restrictions of the form ‘It is always wrong to perform actions of type X’, where X might stand for ‘taking innocent life’
or ‘betraying one’s friends’, are simply not allowed. At the personal level,
this meant that utilitarianism must collide with the belief that it is always
dishonourable – a violation of personal integrity – to act in certain ways
(Williams 1973). At the public level, the charge was that utilitarianism encouraged a kind of cynicism in which nothing the state did could be described simply as morally intolerable, since it was always possible to find
consequentialist reasons to justify what had been done. In the century of
Stalin, Hitler and the Holocaust, this was no merely abstract consideration. Later, the Vietnam War was thought to show what may happen when
governments make their decisions on the basis of a kind of cost-benefit
451

Science, modernism and politics
analysis, admitting no absolute moral limits on what they can do (Hampshire
1978).
During the 1960s and 1970s, then, political theorists began to search for
alternatives to utilitarianism that could remedy these defects while still providing firm foundations for the liberal state. Utilitarianism became, and has
since remained, a minority view, even though it has continued to find vigorous defenders (see Smart 1973; Singer 1979; Hardin 1988; Goodin 1995).
The strongest argument that can be made on its behalf is perhaps that it can
provide coherent guidance to legislators and policy-makers, who must consider the general long-term consequences of the decisions they make and
the overall welfare of the people affected by those decisions. Yet even in this
role – as a public political philosophy rather than a personal ethic – it faces
difficulties. There are formidable problems associated with the utilitarian
calculus itself – the problem of discovering how much welfare or happiness
each person would derive from the implementation of different policies,
and the problem of aggregating these individual utilities into an overall
measure of social utility. Even if these problems could somehow be overcome, most political theorists would continue to argue that non-utilitarian
principles – principles of liberty, equality, individual rights and others –
set limits to what governments may legitimately do in pursuit of the general happiness. Utilitarianism, therefore, cannot serve as a complete public
philosophy.
Political obligation, authority and civil disobedience
Utilitarianism’s incompleteness is especially evident with regard to political
obligation and civil disobedience. For the utilitarian, whether one ought or
ought not to obey the law is a matter of deciding which course of action
will produce the better consequences. But this response simply bypasses the
question of whether citizens – especially the citizens of a democratic state –
have a moral obligation to comply with properly enacted laws.
In the political climate of the 1960s and 1970s, this old question of political obligation took on a new urgency. People involved in the civil rights
and anti-war movements in the USA, and in campaigns against nuclear
weapons in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, had to decide whether their
protests should remain within the bounds of law or whether the gravity of the issues at stake could justify flag-burning, draft-dodging, illegal
occupation of military sites, and other acts of civil disobedience. Analytical political philosophers in the 1950s had argued that the problem of
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political obligation could be dissolved by observing that acknowledging
an obligation to obey the law was simply part of what it meant to belong
to a political society (Macdonald 1951; Weldon 1953; McPherson 1967).
Such views were hard to sustain, however, when democratic governments
were following policies that significant numbers of their citizens regarded as
immoral.
Utilitarians aside, most liberals had accepted Locke’s argument that citizens were bound to obey because they had consented, either expressly or
tacitly, to the state’s authority over them (Locke 1963 [1689–90]). But showing that citizens had generally behaved in a way that implied consent proved
an embarrassing problem. Despite Plamenatz’s attempt to revive consent
theory in something like its traditional form, this embarrassment led analytical theorists to search for an alternative (Plamenatz 1938). Some turned
to hypothetical consent as the grounds of political obligation. What counts,
on this view, is not whether one has consented to obey the laws of one’s
country but whether one would consent, freely and rationally, to obey them.
What counts, in other words, is whether the state in question is legitimate,
or the kind of state to which one ought to consent (Pitkin 1965–6; Kavka
1986, pp. 398–407). But this proves to be a consent theory in which the
idea of consent does no work at all. If the legitimacy or worthiness of the
government or state is what matters, then one may as well dispense with
the idea of consent (Schmidtz 1990). Or one could take consent quite seriously and insist that it must be actual rather than hypothetical or implied,
which entails that states must undertake reforms that give people suitable
opportunities to express their consent and reasonable alternatives should
they withhold it (Beran 1987). Such a theory of ‘reformist consent’ cannot
ground an obligation to obey the laws of existing states, however, for none
of them, no matter how worthy, provide the requisite opportunities and
alternatives; nor is it likely that these can be provided (Klosko 1991).
Reflection on the difficulties of consent theory has led some thinkers in
the analytical tradition to espouse ‘philosophical anarchism’. These ‘anarchists’ deny not only that most people have a general obligation to obey the
law but also that states or their officials even have the authority to enact and
enforce laws. The anarchists’ arguments take a stronger and a weaker form.
The stronger claim is that it is impossible to provide a satisfactory account
of a general obligation to obey the law. Any such obligation must rest on the
belief that political authority is ‘the right to command, and correlatively, the
right to be obeyed’, and this belief is at odds with our ‘primary obligation’
of autonomy, which requires us to decide for ourselves, not merely to
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follow orders (Wolff 1970, pp. 4 and 18). The weaker form of philosophical
anarchism holds that none of the many attempts to ground political obligation have succeeded, which suggests that none will. The conclusion, then, is
that only those relatively few people who have explicitly committed themselves to obedience have anything like a general obligation to obey the laws
under which they live (Simmons 1979). Philosophical anarchists of both
kinds admit that we probably have good reasons, moral as well as prudential,
to obey the laws, but an obligation to obey those in authority is not one of
them.
Other philosophers have stopped short of philosophical anarchism by
accepting the first conclusion – that there is no general obligation to obey
the law – but not the anarchists’ denial of political authority. They do this
on the grounds that political authority does not entail an obligation to be
obeyed by those subject to the authority (Green 1988; and the essays by
Smith, Sartorius, Raz and Greenawalt in Edmundson 1999). In this dispute,
much depends upon what counts as the proper analysis of ‘authority’.
Most recent attempts to justify political obligation have appealed either
to fair play or membership. As formulated by H. L. A. Hart (1955) and Rawls
(1964; but cf. Rawls 1971, §§18, 19, 51, 52), the principle of fair play (or
fairness) holds that everyone who participates in a just, mutually beneficial,
cooperative practice or endeavour has an obligation to bear a fair share of the
burdens of the practice. This obligation is owed to the others who cooperate
in the practice, for cooperation is what makes it possible for the practice to
produce benefits. Anyone who enjoys the benefits without contributing to
their production is liable to blame and punishment as one who takes unfair
advantage of others, even if his or her shirking does not directly threaten
the survival of the practice.
The principle of fairness applies to a political society only if that society
can reasonably be regarded as a cooperative enterprise. If so, the members
of the polity have an obligation of fair play to do their part in maintaining
the enterprise. Because the rule of law is necessary to this end, the principal
form of cooperation is obeying the law. Fair play allows that overriding considerations may warrant civil disobedience, but in their absence the members
of the polity qua cooperative practice must honour their obligation to each
other to obey the laws.
The principal objection to the fairness theory is that political societies,
even the best of them, are not cooperative practices that generate political obligations. As developed forcefully by Nozick (1974, pp. 90–5) and
Simmons (1979, ch. V), the criticism is that fair play requires the voluntary
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acceptance of benefits – otherwise, people could foist obligations on us by
giving us unsolicited benefits – and this kind of voluntary acceptance is too
rare to provide the basis for political obligation. The principle’s advocates
have responded by arguing that voluntary acceptance is not as rare as the
critics charge (Dagger 1997, ch. 5; Kavka 1986, pp. 409–13), and that obligations of fairness may obtain even when people cannot avoid the receipt of
such benefits as national defence and the rule of law (Arneson 1982; Klosko
1992).
The belief that obligations need not derive from voluntary commitments
is also central to the membership (or associative) theory of political obligation. Here the key idea is that the political community, like the family,
generates obligations even among those who have not chosen to be members. Like ‘family and friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate’, political association ‘is in itself pregnant of obligation’
(Dworkin 1986, p. 206). There is thus no need to justify political obligation
by appealing to voluntary commitment or some fundamental moral principle, for political obligations, like other associative obligations, grow out of
‘deep-rooted connections with our sense of who we are and our place in
the world, [and] have a particularly fundamental role in our moral being’
(Horton 1992, p. 157).
Critics of the membership theory charge that it depends upon an implausible analogy between small and intimate associations, such as the family, and
the large and impersonal state (Simmons 1996; Wellman 1997). As with fair
play, the complaint is that membership may generate obligations, but not
political obligations. We are left with contending theories of political obligation, then, and no consensus as to which of them is best – or (as the essays
in Edmundson 1999 attest) whether any of them is even satisfactory.
There are, however, two points on which there is wide agreement among
analytical theorists. The first is that the obligation to obey the law, if it
exists at all, must be defeasible rather than absolute, for it is always possible
that other moral considerations may override this obligation. The second
point of agreement, following from the first, is that civil disobedience is
sometimes just and proper. No matter how free, open and democratic a state
may be, there is always a chance that some injustice will be done to some
of its members, or perhaps to foreigners, that warrants civil disobedience.
What counts as civil disobedience remains a matter of dispute – must it be
direct disobedience of the law(s) in question, for instance, or may it allow
disobeying one law, such as trespass, as an indirect protest against another? –
but the possibility of justifying civil disobedience does not.
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The contractarian alternative to utilitarianism
The attempt to answer questions about political obligation leads quickly, as
we have seen, into other issues, such as authority, justice, rights and the common good, thereby pressing political thinkers toward more comprehensive
and systematic theories. The most important systematic political philosophy
developed as an alternative to utilitarianism in the analytical tradition has
been social contract theory, especially in the form advanced by John Rawls.
Its attraction lay mainly in two features. First, it embraced the individualism
at the heart of utilitarianism, but promised to rid it of the possibility that the
interests of the few might be sacrificed to the greater welfare of the many.
According to contractarianism, a political order is legitimate when it is based
on principles that everyone in the society in question can accept. Everyone
enjoys a veto, so to speak, on the principles that will govern the society,
thereby ruling out principles whose operation might prove detrimental to
particular persons or groups of people. Second, contractarians such as Rawls
believed that this test would select a clear and consistent set of principles
of justice, so that public policy might be guided with more precision than
utilitarian criteria provided. Rawls’ aim, then, was to lay out certain principles of justice, and then to show that every citizen who thought rationally
about how his or her society ought to be governed would agree to these
principles.
In the earliest version of his theory, Rawls envisioned a social contract
that people, taken just as they were, would agree to sign when they reflected
on the long-term gains and losses they would incur under alternative sets
of principles (Rawls 1958). But by the time the theory took definitive
form in A Theory of Justice, Rawls had modified his argument so that the
contract was now to be made behind ‘a veil of ignorance’ (Rawls 1971, §24).
This required his readers to imagine that the people choosing principles of
justice would know the general facts of social life but not their personal
tastes, abilities or social positions. Rawls claimed that the choosers would
select two principles. The first specified that each person should enjoy the
greatest degree of personal liberty consistent with everyone else enjoying an
equal liberty, which in practice meant that they should enjoy rights to speak
and act freely, to associate with others and to vote in elections – in other
words, the civil and political rights well established in liberal democracies.
The second governed the distribution of social and economic resources:
income, wealth and opportunity. Rawls argued that his choosers would start
by assuming that these should be distributed equally. They would soon see,
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however, that there were circumstances in which an unequal distribution
might be to everyone’s advantage – if, for instance, economic inequalities
served as incentives to those who produced goods and services, thus leading
to a greater overall volume of production – and they would accept such
inequalities if they were fairly gained. So Rawls’ second principle stated
that material inequalities were fair when they could be expected to work
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society, and so
long as they were attached to social positions that everyone had an equal
opportunity to fill. This principle required equality of opportunity in the
education system and the job market, and redistribution of resources from
the better-off to the worse-off up to the point at which further attempts
to redistribute would backfire by undermining incentives. The outcome
of Rawls’ hypothetical social contract, therefore, was a social democratic
state which preserved and privileged liberal freedoms, but constrained the
workings of the market in the interests, primarily, of the least fortunate.
Is Rawls’ theory formally valid? That is, would rational people placed
behind a veil of ignorance actually choose the two principles he lays down?
This is one of two main questions prompted by Rawls’ theory. The second
is how much weight, if any, we should give to a hypothetical contract – a
thought experiment in which people are deprived of personal information
that they do, of course, have in their daily lives. Rawls’ aim was to propose
a public conception of justice – a conception that would allow people in
actual societies to justify their shares of material and immaterial benefits to
one another even when the size of those shares is fully known. If my income
is much larger than yours, can I justify this inequality to you by arguing that
you would have chosen a principle that permits inequalities of this kind
behind a veil of ignorance?
Rawls has been widely criticised on both counts. Few critics were persuaded that choosers behind a veil of ignorance would give liberty the absolute priority over material resources that Rawls requires, or that they would
assess alternative material distributions exclusively in terms of the share of
resources going to the worst-off group (e.g. Hart 1973; Barry 1973). Indeed,
some critics argued that the natural outcome of Rawls’ social contract would
be a modified form of the principle of utility – an ironic consequence, given
that Rawls’ whole endeavour had been directed at finding a contractarian alternative to utilitarianism (Harsanyi 1982; Arrow 1973). Others argued that
appealing to a hypothetical contract was the wrong way to generate a public
conception of justice. In stripping his choosers of all knowledge of their beliefs, tastes and capacities, Rawls had also stripped away elements essential to
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the personal identity of some members of existing political societies (Sandel
1982). One could not, for instance, justify freedom of conscience to a religious believer by asking him to consider what principles he would choose
if he did not know whether he was a believer or an atheist. If he took his
religious convictions to be an inescapable part of his identity, he might well
regard that question as ethically irrelevant.
In the years following publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls responded
to these criticisms by softening the contractarian element in his thinking.
Although he continues to stand by his two principles of justice, he relied
less on the hypothetical contract to justify them and more on two other
claims: that they can form the basis of an ‘overlapping consensus’ between
people of diverse moral, philosophical and religious outlooks, and that they
are potentially stable, in the sense that people will find them acceptable in
practice and become increasingly attached to them over time. People in
contemporary democratic societies are irreversibly divided over questions
of ultimate value, but nonetheless they must live together on the basis of
principles that each person (or at least each ‘reasonable’ person) can accept –
principles, Rawls argued, that his theory is uniquely qualified to provide
(Rawls 1993).
Although Rawls’ version of the social contract remained the most influential by far in the second half of the twentieth century, other philosophers
have devised other forms of contractarianism. These fall roughly into two
categories. In one are theories that attempt to provide a more ‘realistic’
alternative to Rawls by scrapping the veil of ignorance and analysing contracts that would be made under conditions of full information. How would
people choose to arrange their social institutions if they all know how they
are likely to fare under the various institutional arrangements that may be
proposed? The key idea here is that everyone must gain relative to a baseline
where common institutions are absent – a state of nature, so to speak, where
individuals are free to act as they please and no principles of justice are in
place. If institutions are to win universal consent, they must ensure that
each person at least does better than he or she would do in what Hobbes
called ‘the condition of meer Nature’ (Hobbes 1968 [1651], p. 196). Two
questions then immediately arise: how are we to identify the relevant baseline, and how should we choose between different ways of distributing the
gains of social cooperation? Contractarians of this type tend to assume that
only a state with quite limited powers would emerge from this process; they
assume, in other words, that the state of nature resembles an economic freefor-all, and those who fared well in it would not agree to redistribution on
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the scale envisaged by Rawls, say. They are happy to accept Rawls’ idea
that society is a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’, but they go
on to insist that ‘mutual advantage’ must be interpreted literally and under
conditions of full knowledge (see especially Buchanan 1975; Gauthier 1986;
and for discussion Barry 1995, ch. 2).
A contrasting interpretation of the social contract has been offered by
moral and political philosophers who claim that the contract should be understood as an agreement between morally motivated individuals. Principles,
especially principles of justice, are acceptable if and only if they could not
reasonably be rejected as a basis for ‘informed, unforced general agreement’
by people seeking to find principles that others with a similar motivation
could also accept (Scanlon 1982, p. 110; elaborated in Scanlon 1998). The
most important contractarian theory of this type has been put forward by
Brian Barry, who claims that a number of relatively concrete principles of
justice will be selected by the reasonable rejection test – for instance that ‘all
inequalities of rights, opportunities and resources have to be justifiable in
ways that cannot reasonably be rejected by those who get least’ (Barry 1998,
p. 147).2 In theories of this kind, a great deal turns on the notion of reasonableness, which leads critics to object that this form of contractarianism can
be made to work only by smuggling the desired practical conclusions into
the motivations of the parties to the contract.
Rights theories
As we have seen, one of the most powerful objections to utilitarianism was
that the principle might in certain circumstances license policy-makers to
override the basic rights of some individuals in the name of the greater good
of the many. The idea that individuals have rights which must on no account
be violated has a long and distinguished pedigree in liberal societies, so it is
hardly surprising that rights-based theories have proved a popular alternative
to utilitarianism among political theorists in the analytical tradition. What
may be more surprising is the sharp opposition within the tradition about
the nature and justification of the rights they seek to defend. There has
been an on-going debate about what it means to have a right – about the
conditions under which we can correctly say that some person P has a right
to some advantage A. Alongside this there has been a more overtly political
disagreement between libertarians, who believe that rights are negative,
2. For the full statement of Barry’s view, see Barry (1995).

459

Science, modernism and politics
protective devices that secure individuals and their property against invasion
by other individuals and the state, and their various opponents, who believe
that individuals also have positive rights to a range of opportunities and
resources, often requiring state provision for their protection.
We cannot do justice here to the intricacies of the first debate. The most
important contenders have been the choice theory of rights, according to
which having a right is to have control over other people’s duties – to be
able to require them to fulfil a duty, or to waive that requirement – and the
benefit theory, according to which having a right is to stand to benefit in an
appropriate way from the performance of the duty. Both theories have been
refined and developed in a variety of ways, with significant implications for
questions of political obligation, the relationship between law and morality,
and other issues in legal and political philosophy. (See Hart 1955 and Raz
1986, ch. 7, for important statements of the choice and benefit theories,
respectively; and Jones 1994; Martin 1993; Waldron 1984 for surveys of the
debate and general discussion of the concept of rights.)
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick 1974) touched off
the debate between libertarians and their opponents over the substance of
rights. Nozick’s book begins with the claim that in order to recognise the
inviolability of persons – that it is never morally justified to sacrifice one
person for the greater good of others – we must attribute to everyone a
set of rights that tightly constrains how others may treat him or her. This
set includes rights to use and control our own bodies and full ownership of
external resources that we have justly acquired. So powerful are these rights
that they put in question the very legitimacy of the state. Nozick asks us to
imagine people living in a state of nature with no political authority, and entrusting the defence of their rights to private protective agencies that would
punish rights-violators and compensate their victims. In these circumstances,
Nozick argues, an institution that we would recognise as a state could emerge
spontaneously from interaction between such agencies, but it could only be
a ‘minimal state’, restricted in its functioning to the protection of personal
and property rights. Individuals may band together to pursue other goals or
goods, but the state is prohibited from using its powers of compulsion for
any purpose other than rights protection: thus taxation is only legitimate to
cover the costs of external defence and administering a legal system.
Nozick goes on to show how a rights theory of this kind excludes not
only utilitarian principles, but Rawlsian principles of justice that require the
state to redistribute resources to the worst-off, principles of equality, and any
principle that requires more than a ‘minimal state’. Because individuals have
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strong rights over their possessions, any political project that infringes these
rights will be illegitimate unless it can command the unanimous support of
those whose rights are in question.
Two issues have dominated the critical reaction to Nozick’s claims. The
first concerns Nozick’s move from the anti-utilitarian premise that individuals must in some sense be treated as inviolable and not be used for the
benefit of others to the conclusion that they have rights of the sort that
he endows them with. In particular critics have argued that self-ownership
rights – rights to bodily integrity and control – and external property rights
have very different implications (see especially Cohen 1995). If I am awarded
rights over some physical thing – a tract of land, say – this immediately prevents you from using that thing without my permission. My freedom may
be enhanced, but yours is restricted. So to justify property rights merely
from the perspective of the right-holder is myopic. Connected to this is the
second issue, namely, how individuals originally acquire the rights that are
later to be treated as sacrosanct. Nozick follows John Locke in maintaining
that people may legitimately acquire property by mixing their labour with
unowned things, and may exchange or transfer the property so acquired
in any way they wish, provided that their acquisition does not worsen the
position of anyone else. But critics have argued that for property rights of
this kind to be justified, people must at least have had an equal opportunity to acquire property in the first place. Even within the libertarian camp,
some, such as Steiner (1994), have insisted that each person must initially be
credited with an equal share of the earth’s natural resources before property
exchange and transfer is allowed to proceed.
This more egalitarian form of libertarian rights theory still conceives of
rights negatively as requirements that others should not interfere with my
person or property. For critics, this negative construal misses the essential
point about rights, which is that they should safeguard the conditions under
which human beings can lead worthwhile lives. These conditions include
protection of person and property, but they may also include the provision
of vital resources – food, medicine, education and so forth. The idea of
human rights, which has assumed increasing importance in international
affairs in the second half of the twentieth century, is usually taken to include
positive rights of this kind. Within the analytical tradition such rights have
been justified by appeals to moral agency or to needs. On the moral agency
view, no one can choose and act morally unless he or she enjoys a certain
minimum level of freedom and well-being. It follows that, regardless of the
particular form of morality one embraces, one must recognise fundamental
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rights to freedom and well-being as a precondition of any morality (see
Gewirth 1978; 1982; 1996; Plant et al. 1980). A more naturalistic approach
grounds rights in needs – such as needs for health and adequate nutrition –
that are common to all human beings regardless of the particular lives that
they choose to lead (see Shue 1980; Donnelly 1985). Both views claim that
the distinction between negative and positive rights is morally arbitrary: it
is as damaging to a person to be deprived of food by famine as it is by theft,
so if individuals have rights not to be deprived of the food they have grown,
they also have a right to be supplied with food if their crops fail through no
fault of their own.
Social justice after Rawls
As noted above, libertarian rights theorists such as Nozick argued for a
minimal state and ruled out any compulsory redistribution from rich to
poor in the name of social justice. Critics argued that states were morally
obliged to protect the (positive) rights of every citizen by guaranteeing the
provision of minimum levels of welfare. Rawls had gone further still in
arguing that justice required not merely the provision of a social minimum
but that inequalities in society must always work to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged members. Rawls, though, did not object to economic
inequalities as such: if they served as incentives encouraging the talented
to be more productive, then his difference principle would justify them.
Subsequent theories of social justice in the analytical tradition have argued
for a stronger form of equality. A common theme has been that justice
requires the elimination of all morally arbitrary inequalities, where ‘morally
arbitrary’ means that the individuals in question cannot be held personally
responsible.
Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources has been particularly
influential in this field (Dworkin 1981). The theory rests upon a basic distinction between a person’s circumstances and her choices – between features of
someone’s situation for which she cannot be held responsible and those for
which she can. Dworkin believes, in particular, that it would be wrong to
try to give people equal levels of well-being, because a person’s well-being
depends on her tastes and preferences, and in normal circumstances people
can properly be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. Equally,
people can be held responsible for the choices they make about how to use
the resources available to them. The level of resources available to someone
forms part of her circumstances, however, so everyone must initially enjoy
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an equal share of such resources. For Dworkin, these resources include not
only wealth, commodities and other external resources, but personal talents
and handicaps. Justice requires, therefore, that every citizen have access to an
equal bundle of resources, taking both internal and external resources into
account; but justice permits subsequent inequalities that result from choices
or preferences.
Since people will value resources differently depending on their preferences, Dworkin’s theory requires some way of deciding whether resource
bundles are equal or not. For external resources he proposes the device of a
hypothetical auction, where resources are divided into lots and each citizen
is given an equal number of tokens with which to bid. The auction continues until each person is satisfied that he has made the best bids he can
given the number of tokens he has and the rival bids of others. The resulting
distribution of resources will be ‘envy-free’ in the sense that no-one prefers
anyone else’s bundle to his own. An equal distribution of external resources,
therefore, is defined as one that could have emerged from such a procedure.
Dworkin faces greater difficulties when dealing with personal resources –
personal talents and handicaps. His theory of justice requires that people
with handicaps should be compensated by being given additional external
resources, and that people with greater talents should be penalised by having
fewer such resources: the principle is that, overall, everyone’s bundle should
be equally valuable to avoid morally arbitrary inequalities. But this requires
that personal resources should be valued in some way, and the auction device
is not appropriate here. Instead, Dworkin resorts to the idea of insurance.
He asks how much people would be prepared, on average, to pay to insure
against a particular form of disability, or to insure against having low levels
of talent, if they did not know what talents or handicaps they actually had.
He argues that the state should use its powers of tax and transfer to simulate
such an insurance scheme – taking resources from the talented in the form
of income taxation to track the insurance premiums they would have paid,
and giving resources to the untalented and the handicapped to track the
payouts they would have received, if such a scheme had existed.
Despite its technical difficulties, Dworkin’s theory of justice ranks alongside Rawls’ as a remarkable attempt to give a principled basis for the distributive practices of modern liberal democracies. Yet critics sympathetic to
the egalitarian thrust of the theory have argued that it focuses too narrowly
on resources. Even if people enjoy equal access to resources in the way that
Dworkin’s theory requires, they may still be relatively advantaged or disadvantaged for reasons that are not traceable to their choices or preferences – in
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particular, they may be more or less able to convert resources into personal
well-being. A handicapped person, for instance, may not only have fewer
opportunities but may also suffer personal distress as a result of the handicap,
and the distress would not count as a resource deficiency. So theorists have
looked for a new ‘currency’ that avoids the difficulties of welfare and of
resources in which to measure egalitarian justice. Amartya Sen has proposed
‘basic capability equality’ – the principle that people should as far as possible
be made equal in their capacity to perform a range of functionings such as
being adequately nourished, being able to move about freely, and avoiding
premature death (Sen 1982; 1992). G. A. Cohen has proposed ‘equal access
to advantage’, where ‘advantage’ is taken to mean some combination of
resources and welfare (Cohen 1989).
A noteworthy feature of all these theories, and one they share with Rawls’,
is that they reject desert, as that idea is commonly understood. Social justice does not, for instance, mean that people who make a larger economic
contribution deserve to receive a higher income. According to egalitarian
theorists, since the size of someone’s contribution depends in part at least
on natural talents, and since natural talents are regarded as morally arbitrary
features, no one can deserve income or other benefits simply for contributing more; at best someone might deserve something for making an effort
or a choice. This feature sets egalitarian theories significantly apart from
public opinion in the societies to which they are meant to apply, where
desert retains a central place in popular conceptions of social justice. Some
analytical theorists have attempted to rescue the idea of desert from egalitarian criticism and to argue that a complete theory of social justice must
find room for desert alongside equality and other distributive principles (see
Lucas 1980; Sher 1987; Miller 1999).
A quite different way of understanding the meaning and value of equality
has been proposed by Michael Walzer (1983). Walzer rejects the idea that
justice can be understood as the equal distribution of any single currency.
Instead, justice is irreducibly plural, in the sense that different social goods –
money, political power, education, recognition and so forth – compose
separate spheres in each of which a different principle of distribution applies.
Yet so long as the separation of spheres is maintained – so long as people
are prevented from converting the advantages they gain in one sphere into
advantages in another, in defiance of the distributive principle that rightfully
applies in the second – a certain kind of equality may be achieved. Walzer
calls this ‘complex equality’. A society of complex equality is one in which
some people are (justly) ahead in the sphere of money, others are ahead
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in the sphere of political power, and so on, but no one wins out in all
the spheres, and so everyone enjoys an equal standing overall. This also
means that Walzer is able to find a limited place for desert within a theory
of equality. So long as specific forms of desert are confined to particular
spheres, and no overall scale of desert is established, recognising desert need
not threaten social equality.
The challenge of communitarianism
Another problem with contemporary theories of justice, according to
Walzer, is that they are too abstract and universalistic. Against them he opposes his ‘radically particularist’ approach, which attends to ‘history, culture,
and membership’ by asking not what ‘rational individuals . . . under universalising conditions of such-and-such a sort’ would choose, but what would
‘individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture
and are determined to go on sharing it?’ (Walzer 1983, pp. xiv and 5). Walzer
thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others
writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and
political neglect.
Nor do these communitarians believe that theoretical indifference has
merely coincided with the erosion of community that they see in the world
around them. In various ways Walzer, Alisdair MacIntyre (1981), Michael
Sandel (1982) and Charles Taylor (1985), among others, have all charged that
the philosophical emphasis on distributive justice and individual rights works
to divide the citizens of the modern state against each other, thereby fostering isolation, alienation and apathy rather than commitment to a common
civic enterprise. This concern with the pernicious effects of individualism
is hardly new – Hegel, de Tocqueville, Durkheim and the British idealists
sounded similar themes in the nineteenth century, as did Rousseau and others even earlier – but it was given a new life and a new opponent as part
of what became known, for better or worse, as the liberal-communitarian
debate.
Those enlisted on the communitarian side of the debate have pressed four
major objections against their ‘liberal’ or ‘individualist’ opponents. The first
is the complaint, already noted in Walzer, that abstract reason will not bear
the weight philosophers have placed on it in their attempts to ground justice
and morality. This ‘Enlightenment project’ (MacIntyre 1981) is doomed by
its failure to recognise that reasoning about these matters cannot proceed
apart from shared traditions and practices, each with its own set of roles,
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responsibilities and virtues. Second, the liberal emphasis on individual rights
and justice comes at the expense of civic duty and the common good. In
Sandel’s words, ‘justice finds its limits in those forms of community that engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants’; ‘to some I owe
more than justice requires or even permits . . . in virtue of those more or less
enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am’ (Sandel 1982, pp. 182 and 179). Contemporary liberals
are blind to these enduring attachments and commitments, according to
the third charge, because they too often rely on an atomistic conception of
the self – an ‘unencumbered self’, in Sandel’s terms – that is supposedly prior
to its ends and attachments. Such a conception is both false and pernicious,
for individual selves are largely constituted by the communities that nurture
and sustain them. When Rawls and other ‘deontological liberals’ teach individuals to think of themselves as somehow prior to and apart from these
communities, they are engaged quite literally in a self -defeating enterprise.
The fourth objection, then, is that these abstract and universalistic theories
of justice and rights have contributed to the withdrawal into private life
and the intransigent insistence on one’s rights against others that threaten
modern societies. There is little sense of a common good or even a common ground on which citizens can meet. As MacIntyre sees it, the conflict
between the advocates of incommensurable moral positions has so riven
modern societies that politics now ‘is civil war carried on by other means’
(MacIntyre 1981, p. 253). The best that we can do in these circumstances
is to agree to disagree while we try to fashion ‘local forms of community
within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained
through the new dark ages which are already upon us’ (MacIntyre 1981,
p. 263).
Before turning to the ‘liberal’ rebuttal, we must note that the communitarian critics of liberalism neither form a well-defined school nor pose a
distinctly extramural challenge to liberalism. Some theorists with communitarian leanings persist in calling themselves liberals (Galston 1991; Spragens
1995). Indeed, it sometimes seems that the communitarians’ fundamental
worry is that other liberals are so preoccupied with the rights and liberties of
the abstract individual that they put the survival of liberal societies at risk.
Whether this worry is well founded is a question that the ‘liberal’ side has
raised in response to the ‘communitarians’.
Here we may distinguish three interlocking responses. The first is that
the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories
they criticise. Thus Rawls maintains (1993, lecture I) that his ‘political’
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conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about
the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the ‘veil
of ignorance’. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable
of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in
many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances.
‘What is central to the liberal view’, according to Will Kymlicka, ‘is not
that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves
to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible
re-examination’ (Kymlicka 1989, p. 52, emphasis in original). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986; 1992)
and Gewirth (1996) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly
well within their existing theories. The third response, finally, is to point
to the dangers of the critics’ appeal to community norms. Communities
have their virtues, but they have their vices, too – smugness, intolerance
and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact
that the communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they ‘want us to live in Salem, but not to believe
in witches’ (Gutmann 1992, p. 133; see also Friedman 1992). If liberals rely
on abstractions and universal considerations in their theories of justice and
rights, that is because they must do so to rise above – and critically assess –
local prejudices that communitarians must simply accept.
Communitarian rejoinders have indicated their sensitivity to this last
point. Some, such as Sandel (1996), have adopted ‘republicanism’ as the
proper name for their position. By allying themselves with the classical or
civic republican tradition of political thought, they have shown that they
are not willing to accept community in all its forms; they have also reduced
the distance between themselves and those who have embraced ‘civic republicanism in the liberal mode’ (Dworkin 1992, p. 220; also Burtt 1993;
Pettit 1997). Others have preferred to retain the communitarian label, but
their rejoinders to ‘liberal’ criticisms stress their desire to strike a balance
between individual rights and civic responsibilities (Etzioni 1997) and to
‘move closer to the ideal of community life’ – a life in which ‘we learn the
value of integrating what we seek individually with the needs and aspirations
of other people’ (Tam 1998, p. 220, emphasis added).
Mistaken or not as a critique of liberalism, communitarianism certainly
has touched a political nerve. There is a communitarian journal, The Responsive Community, a Communitarian Platform and a Communitarian Network
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that extends throughout Europe and North America. If there is no Communitarian Party competing for office, communitarian ideas and rhetoric have
certainly been evident in a number of other parties and places – notably the
Clinton administration in the United States and Tony Blair’s Labour government in Britain. Among practising politicians, in fact, communitarians may
have achieved more influence than those whose abstract and individualistic
theories they have sought to counteract.
Conclusion
Any attempt to assess the accomplishments of twentieth-century analytical
political philosophy must confront two difficulties. The first is that our subject clearly continues to be a going enterprise – a growth industry, one might
say, in which practitioners of the analytical approach take up new topics and
spread around the globe. Indeed, space limitations prevent us from surveying
the breadth of analytical political theory in this chapter. In addition to the
topics we have discussed, a full treatment would explore the analysis of authority, freedom, power and other political concepts; survey contributions
to the understanding of voting schemes, systems of representation and other
topics in democratic theory; attend to the use of prisoners’ dilemmas, free
riders and other concepts of social choice theory to clarify various problems
of politics; and take account of significant work on law and legal systems in
analytical jurisprudence.
The second difficulty lies in determining what counts as success and
failure for an enterprise of this kind. If the goal is to achieve fixed and uncontestable understandings of key concepts or to arrive at nearly unanimous
agreement on basic principles, then analytical theorists have thus far failed.
Even when a particular analysis of a concept seems definitive – as may be
the case with Hanna Pitkin’s work on representation (Pitkin 1967) – this
conceptual agreement does not lead to agreement on the political or institutional form that representation should take. By this standard, however, it
is doubtful that any political theory could ever succeed. Nor is it a standard
that most analytical theorists have aspired to reach. According to Berlin and
other value-pluralists, in fact, the conflict among incommensurable goods
forecloses the possibility of nearly unanimous agreement on substantive principles. Moreover, conceptual analysis has taught most analytical theorists that
political concepts are such constitutive parts of political contests – perhaps
even ‘essentially contestable’ parts (Gallie 1966; MacIntyre 1973; but cf. Ball
1988, ch. 1) – that they do not lend themselves to precise definition. As a
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form of activity that proceeds through argument, debate and deliberation,
that is, politics necessarily relies on concepts. Insofar as conceptual analysis changes the way people define and employ such concepts as freedom,
justice, democracy and the public interest, it must therefore change the way
they think and act politically (Ball, Farr and Hanson 1989). However much
they may desire to be dispassionate scholars, analytical theorists thus find
themselves engaged in an enterprise that is inescapably political. In these
circumstances, they will almost certainly fail to reach agreement on fixed
and uncontestable understandings of key concepts.
But if the goal of the analytical school is the more modest one of bringing
conceptual clarity and argumentative rigour to political thinking, thereby
encouraging citizens to think more clearly and consistently about the politics
of the day, then analytical political philosophy has surely achieved some
success. The continuing importance in political debates of such concepts
as positive and negative liberty, equality of opportunity, human rights and
the public interest is one form of evidence. Another is the way in which
analytical theorists have been able to bring their skills to bear upon new
concerns as the politics of the day shifts and changes direction. This has been
particularly evident in recent years as many of these theorists have looked
to issues such as education, multiculturalism, nationalism, threats to the
environment, and global and intergenerational justice. Analytical theorists
may be academics, but they are academics who believe that their theory
can and should inform political practice. In this respect, analytical political
theory continues to be political theory written from the perspective of the
responsible citizen.
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